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Moral or political? Can’t human rights be both moral and political—and can’t they be 
so in a variety of senses? It is plausible to think so. But one could be forgiven for assum-
ing that philosophers have come to think otherwise.1
Over the past decade or so, philosophers have grown divided over the question of 
how to properly conceive of human rights. On the one hand, there are “orthodox”2 
theorists (sometimes referred to as “naturalistic,”3 “humanist,”4 “traditional,”5 “old-
fashioned,”6 or “philosophical”7). These theorists think of human rights as natural 
rights: moral rights that we have simply in virtue of being human. On the other hand, 
there are “political”8 theorists (sometimes referred to as “practical,”9 “institutionalist,”10 
or “functional”11) who think of human rights as rights that play a distinctive role, or set 
of roles, in modern international politics: setting standards of political legitimacy,12 
serving as norms of international concern,13 and/or imposing limits on the exercise of 
national sovereignty.14
Some may wonder why it is worth reading what philosophers have to say about 
these matters. After all, wouldn’t it be better if we spent our time promoting human 
rights, or doing human rights “work,” rather than engaging in intellectual debates 
about what such rights really are (if it even makes sense to ask such a question)?
This is a legitimate concern. But the Orthodox–Political debate, as I shall refer to it 
here, is not blind to it. In some ways, the debate shows that philosophers too are puz-
zled about their role when it comes to human rights. And this is at least partly due to 
the multifaceted nature of human rights themselves—their involvement in various 
domains of human life and thought.
In one guise, human rights present themselves to us as a bundle of supposedly 
natural or objective moral facts—facts that determine what we owe to each other as 
1 A special thanks to James W. Nickel and Rowan Cruft for helpful comments on an earlier version of 
this introduction.
2 Tasioulas 2010. 3 Beitz 2009; Liao & Etinson 2012. 4 Gilabert 2011. 5 Raz 2010.
6 Buchanan & Sreenivasan in this volume. 7 Jones 1996. 8 Raz 2010; Valentini 2011a.
9 Beitz 2009; Wenar 2005. 10 Sangiovanni 2007. 11 Griffin 2008, p. 27; Tasioulas 2012.
12 Dworkin 2011, pp. 332–9; Williams 2005, pp. 62–4. 13 Beitz 2009, p. 109.
14 Rawls 1999, pp. 78–82; Raz 2010, p. 328.
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human beings. The human right to freedom from slavery, for instance, looks a lot 
like this.15 It prohibits the enslavement of anyone by anyone, and it does so (by all 
appearances) objectively: the normative force of the prohibition, or the “wrongness” of 
slavery, does not depend on its recognition by any group or person, let alone any popu-
lar moral code, institutional system, or positive body of law. Slavery was not any less of 
a human rights violation when (not all that long ago) most of the planet thought that it 
was morally and legally permissible to hold slaves.
Seen in this light, human rights look like a topic in moral philosophy, one that can be 
approached with the traditional tools of the armchair philosopher: principled reasoning, 
moral intuition, and (when necessary) empirical information to help apply abstract 
norms to specific circumstances. This vision fits nicely with the Orthodox conception 
of human rights, which emphasizes their status as moral rights. And philosophers, on 
this view, have a reasonably clear intellectual and practical role to play when it comes 
to human rights: like natural rights theorists of the past, philosophers can be expected 
to tell us what human rights there are, why (and how) they exist, and what they con-
cretely require of us.
But human rights present themselves to us in other guises as well. In addition to 
seeming morally real, or part of what the British legal philosopher H. L. A Hart called 
“critical” morality, human rights are also standards that many people around the world 
happen to believe in, which makes them part of various “positive” or popular moralities 
too.16 Moreover, human rights are deeply embedded in contemporary politics and law—
both domestically, regionally, and internationally.17
The fact that human rights are today explicitly recognized norms of popular mor-
ality, political practice, and legal institutions throughout the world—the fact that it 
is now perfectly meaningful to speak of things like human rights “culture,” human rights 
“practice,” the human rights “movement,” and human rights “law”—is of enormous 
practical and theoretical significance.
It is of practical significance because it is hard to imagine how the promise of human 
rights will ever be fulfilled without things like real-world belief in their importance, as 
well as recognition in politics and enforcement through law. These are the chief mech-
anisms through which human rights are realized, or not realized.
It is of theoretical significance for a number of reasons. First, contrary to Platonic 
stereotypes, philosophers, like other theorists, do take an interest in the world around 
them. The recent surge in scholarship on human rights—not just in philosophy but 
also in history, law, political science, and international relations—has a great deal to do 
with the recent success of human rights as a public idea. If it were not for the increased 
profile of human rights in political rhetoric, the popular imagination, the media, and 
law, contemporary scholars of human rights would probably have devoted their 
15 Article 4, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] (1948); Article 8, The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] (1966/1976).
16 Hart 1994, p. 301.
17 For a comprehensive overview, see: Alston & Goodman 2012; Nickel 2007, ch. 1.
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energies elsewhere—certainly, a large edited volume like this is unlikely to have found 
its way into existence. And this is no doubt as it should be, which raises a second point.
Sometimes we want philosophy to help us interpret or make sense of our ideals and 
practices as they are. At other times we quite reasonably want philosophy (as well as 
literature and the arts, etc.) to operate in a normative mode—that is, to help us reimagine 
our ideals and practices as they ought to be. Once we home in on the public life of 
human rights as a key object of theoretical interest, however, we might wonder how 
best to normatively appraise it. We can always try to imagine human rights practice, 
human rights law, or the human rights movement as they might (ideally) be. But this 
should be more than a haphazard effort. What are the standards against which these 
phenomena should be judged?
One answer, perhaps the most obvious one, is that we should judge the public reality 
of human rights by how well it lines up with the moral reality thereof. After all, if there 
is a moral human right to freedom from slavery, then presumably popular morality, 
politics, and law should reflect this. And this seems to be true of countless other moral 
human rights as well.
But this suggestion overlooks the fact that the positivization of human rights has a 
logic of its own. Like other kinds of law, human rights law is something more than just 
a vehicle for the expression of moral standards. The law is a public instrument that, 
among other things, is designed to facilitate stable and predictable social relations. 
Unlike moral norms, which might be enforced in any number of ways, legal norms are 
typically enforced by means of coercive power.18 And given the public role of law, there 
may be good reason for it to avoid ruling on issues that are marked by strong dissensus. 
Morality, by contrast, does not seem to operate under this same constraint; it can be as 
controversial as it turns out (or as we take it) to be.
With this in mind, perhaps not all (moral) human rights are well suited for legal 
protection. For instance, as John Tasioulas, a key champion of the Orthodox concep-
tion of human rights, has argued, the human right to a fair say in important family 
decisions (e.g., about the division of spousal labour) is morally plausible but nonethe-
less ill-suited for legal recognition.19 Despite their far-reaching effects and enormous 
potential for unfairness, such decisions are extremely difficult to regulate and (in any 
case) strike us as importantly “private.”
In other instances, there may be good reason to codify a legal human right that has 
no direct moral counterpart. For example, as Gopal Sreenivasan and Allen Buchanan 
suggest in this volume, a legal human right to health has various potential benefits beyond 
the promotion and/or protection of health itself: these may include improvements in 
18 It is true that international human rights law is not coercively enforced in the way that domestic law 
typically is. That said, the norms of international human rights law are designed to be incorporated into 
domestic law, where they (standardly) would be coercively enforced (see: Article 2, ICCPR; Article 2, 
ICESCR). Thus, in a very important sense, these legal norms are developed with the aim of coercive 
enforcement in mind.
19 Tasioulas 2012, p. 2. Sen (2004, pp. 326–8) makes a similar point.
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happiness, social solidarity, economic productivity, and the more general realization 
of a just and humane society, etc. Perhaps these aggregate benefits, if real, are enough to 
justify the enactment of a legal human right to health even if it turns out that there is no 
equivalent moral right, as some contend.20
At the very least, these considerations complicate the task of evaluating human rights 
law. They suggest that responsibly measuring its success (or ideal content) is more than 
just a matter of seeing how well it conforms to, expresses, or enforces human rights 
morality—that we cannot know what legal human rights there should be simply by 
knowing what moral human rights there are, and vice versa. And perhaps something 
like this is true of popular morality and politics as well. After all, not all good moral 
causes make for good political platforms, institutional projects, or social movements.
For instance, one prominent complaint about the human rights movement is that, for 
all its noble intentions, its focus on basic liberties and social services distracts us from 
more pressing “structural” injustices, including historically unprecedented levels of 
global and domestic economic inequality.21 Perhaps there really are ways in which the 
belief in (or practical pursuit of) human rights—via popular morality, social mobiliza-
tion, and/or political institutionalization—can have adverse effects overall. And perhaps 
these adverse effects give us reason to rethink how (or even whether) morally justified 
human rights should be institutionalized and socially disseminated.
All of this leaves the role of the philosopher somewhat unclear when it comes to 
evaluating the public life of human rights. Even if we suppose (no doubt contentiously)22 
that philosophers are capable of moral expertise—and, in particular, expert knowledge 
of the moral requirements of human rights—this would still not guarantee them insight 
into what human rights politics and law, or what the human rights movement, ought to 
be like. The independent life and logic of these real-world phenomena makes their 
evaluation a special task of its own, perhaps one that philosophers (or at least moral 
theorists) are in no privileged position to pursue.
This is the kind of observation that motivates the Political approach to human 
rights. According to one of its most prominent defenders, Joseph Raz, the Political 
approach acknowledges that contemporary human rights “practice” (largely a legal 
phenomenon, in his view)23 cannot be evaluated on the basis of moral insight alone. 
Just as it would be strange to evaluate the content of the law without some understand-
ing of the functions of law in general, Raz suggests that contemporary human rights 
practice ought to be evaluated under the light of a faithful understanding of what it is 
that the practice aims to do.
Following John Rawls, the original proponent of this approach,24 Raz argues that 
the main function of human rights practice is political: to make states answerable to 
the international community when it comes to their treatment of individual persons. 
20 Buchanan & Sreenivasan in this volume. Also see: Buchanan 2013, p. 53.
21 For a broad discussion, see: Gilabert in this volume, Sec. 2.2.4. Also see: Moyn 2015 & 2018.
22 See e.g. McGrath 2008; Nussbaum 2002; Singer 1972.
23 Raz in this volume. Also see: Etinson in this volume, for a broader discussion. 24 Rawls 1999.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/07/2018, SPi
Introduction 5
With this function in view, Raz outlines the standards against which the practice 
should be judged. Genuine human rights—those which ought to be recognized by the 
practice if they are not already—consist in the set of individual moral rights that can be 
justifiably held against states in this way, i.e. as potential defeaters of state sovereignty. 
Evaluating contemporary human rights practice is ultimately a matter of figuring out 
which moral rights these are, and then seeing whether or how well they are represented 
in the practice itself.25
Understood in this way, Raz’s theory appeals to relatively ordinary moral and pol-
itical considerations. It requires us to think, on the one hand, about which individual 
moral rights (if any) should be a matter of state responsibility, and on the other, 
about when (if ever) the failure to meet such responsibilities should render a state 
liable to external interference or review.26 No doubt, these are complex calculations, 
but they draw on ordinary normative considerations (about the grounds of individ-
ual moral rights, and of state sovereignty, etc.) that apply in various contexts, not just 
contemporary human rights practice.
Some proponents of the Political approach think that this is a mistake. According to 
Charles Beitz, for example, taking the normative independence of contemporary 
human rights practice seriously requires evaluating it entirely on its own terms—that 
is, in light of concepts and considerations that are unique (or “sui generis”) to the prac-
tice itself.27 For Beitz, even the concept of rights operative in the practice is unique and 
unbeholden to standard theoretical understandings thereof.28 This might make the 
practice look deficient from various well-established theoretical points of view, but, as 
Beitz argues, so much the worse for the establishment: “Why should we insist that 
international human rights conform to a received philosophical conception rather 
than interpret them, as they present themselves, as a distinct normative system con-
structed to play a certain special role in global political life?”29
The Orthodox–Political debate, then, is as much about the nature and limits of 
philosophy as it is about human rights. It is as much a debate about how to theorize 
human rights—and to what end—as it is about human rights themselves. In part, 
the debate reflects recent trends in moral and political philosophy: trends that have 
opened up questions about how normative or “utopian” philosophical theory should 
be,30 about the role of moral theory (and “truth”) in politics,31 and about the relevance 
of political institutions to political theory.32 But most of all the debate reflects the 
innate complexity of its subject matter—the many lives of human rights, as it were.
The title of this volume, then, is not meant to assert any kind of fundamental 
 opposition or contradiction. Rather, it is meant to highlight this innate complexity, 
25 Raz 2010, p. 327. 26 Raz 2010, pp. 335–6. 27 Beitz 2009, p. 12, 197.
28 Beitz 2009, p. 119. 29 Beitz 2009, p. 61.
30 See e.g. Estlund 2014; Rawls 1999, esp. pp. 11–23; Valentini 2012.
31 See e.g. Rawls 2005; Raz 1998; Quong 2010.
32 See e.g. Cohen 2010; James 2005; Sangiovanni 2007; Valentini 2011b; Waldron 2013.
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the philosophical debate that has grown out of it, and the many questions it continues 
to raise.
* * *
This volume has two central aims. First, it aims to make new headway in the 
Orthodox–Political debate, moving it beyond its current state of progress. The bulk 
of that work can be found in Part II, which is where the most direct contributions to 
the debate have been gathered. The second aim of the volume is to provide a state-of-
the-art discussion of a number of important topics that are closely connected to the 
Orthodox–Political debate, but not normally a focal point thereof. That work can be 
found in Parts I, III, IV, V, and VI.
So far, the Orthodox–Political debate has focused on questions about the nature of 
human rights (What are human rights?), their grounds (What justifies their normative 
existence or authority?), their content (What human rights are there?), and about 
the aims and methods of a philosophical theory of human rights in general. But as a 
debate that is, at its core, instigated by the complex status of human rights as both crit-
ical standards of morality, on the one hand, and positive standards of law, politics, and 
popular morality, on the other, it in fact raises a much broader set of questions.
This volume explores a handful of key topics within that broader set. These include 
questions about: the relevance of the real-world history of human rights to their philo-
sophical comprehension (Part I); how to properly understand the relationship between 
human rights morality and law (III); how to balance the aspirational or “utopian” char-
acter of human rights—their description of an ideal world—with the requirement that 
they be feasible in the here and now (IV); the role of human rights in a world shaped by 
politics and power (V); and how to make sense of the ascription of human rights to 
both individuals, on the one hand, and political communities, on the other (VI).
In exploring these adjacent topics, the volume aims not just to deepen our under-
standing of some important questions about human rights, but also to exploit the 
opportunity this provides for interdisciplinary engagement. Several of the author-
commentator pairings in the volume place scholars from different disciplines 
(including history, philosophy, international law, political science, and legal theory) 
into direct dialogue with one another on a shared topic. Human rights have become 
an extraordinarily active area of research in a wide variety of disciplines, but the 
coordination and communication of research across disciplinary boundaries is rare 
and frequently prone to misunderstanding. Working across these boundaries, or at 
least trying (as several authors in this volume do) to figure out how research on 
human rights in any one discipline bears on research in others, is an important task 
in its own right. It is also crucial to determining just where philosophical theory fits 
into the impressive range of work currently being done on human rights, both intel-
lectually and practically, which is a key preoccupation of the Orthodox–Political 
debate itself.
* * *
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The remainder of this introduction aims to give the reader some sense of the content of 
the volume, of how it builds on current scholarship, and highlights key starting points 
for critical reflection.33
I. The Relevance of History
The volume begins with a series of contributions that tackle the question of how the 
history of human rights bears (or should bear) on the philosophy thereof. What rele-
vance, if any, do historical claims about human rights (e.g. about the series of events 
that lead to the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights on December 10th, 1948) have to the conceptual claims (e.g. about the 
nature of human rights) that philosophers tend to be interested in?
It is easy to picture philosophers (concerned, as one might imagine, strictly with 
timeless and universal truths) adopting a hard-line stance here: one that denies that 
philosophy, properly understood, ought to take any account of historical facts about 
human rights. But interestingly, philosophers have by and large gone a different 
route. Historical claims about human rights have in fact played a prominent role in 
the Orthodox–Political debate. For example, in Raz’s view, one of the main problems 
with Orthodox theories of human rights is their anachronism. By understanding 
human rights to be (in essence) natural rights, Raz argues that such theories fail to 
capture the special functions that human rights have come to play in international 
legal and political practice today. In other words, if Orthodox theories ever did pro-
vide a valid benchmark against which to evaluate human rights practice, in Raz’s 
view they no longer do; the practice has changed in ways that render such theories 
irrelevant or obsolete.
Raz tries to provide us with what he thinks are the right criteria for evaluating 
human rights practice in a given historical period: one that starts roughly at the end of 
the Second World War—or, at the very latest, after the collapse of the Soviet Union34—
and continues into the present day. During this period, Raz suggests that for the first 
time in history it has become internationally conventional to treat the violation of 
 certain individual rights (called “human rights”) as grounds for intervention in a state’s 
sovereign affairs.
As already mentioned, Raz takes this to be the “distinctive” function of human rights 
practice.35 And even though other proponents of the Political approach, such as 
Charles Beitz and John Rawls, offer subtly different accounts of this function,36 their 
historical focus is much the same.37 All three of these thinkers see themselves as cap-
turing, in theoretical terms, an important historical shift in the international order that 
33 For a state-of-the-art and comprehensive overview of contemporary philosophical debates about 
human rights, see: Cruft, Liao, & Renzo 2015.
34 Raz 2015, p. 217. 35 Raz in this volume.
36 See: footnotes 12, 13, and 14 in this introduction. 37 See: Beitz 2009, p. 13; Rawls 1999, p. 79.
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began sometime after the end of the Second World War, and which saw human rights 
take on a new regulatory role in global politics and law.
Orthodox theorists do not necessarily deny the reality of this shift, nor are they 
disinterested in the history of human rights. On the contrary, Orthodox theorists, just 
like their Political counterparts, are keen to capture (in theory) the distinctive func-
tions attributed to human rights (in legal and political practice) since the end of the 
Second World War.38 Where Orthodox and Political theorists differ is in their reading 
of which of these functions are worth incorporating into the concept of human rights 
and which are not.
Orthodox theorists accept that human rights have been ascribed new and important 
institutional roles over the last half-century or so. What they deny is that these changes 
are of conceptual significance, or that they should (in some fundamental way) govern 
our evaluation of the practice.
Rather than emphasize the theoretical significance of historical shifts, Orthodox 
theorists tend to emphasize the significance of certain continuities across the historical 
trajectory of human rights. For example, James Griffin, a key proponent of the Orthodox 
approach, argues that the modern (post-1948) idea of human rights is identical to its 
Enlightenment era predecessor:
The notion of human rights that emerged by the end of the Enlightenment—what can reasonably 
be called the Enlightenment notion—is the notion we have today. There has been no theoretical 
development of the idea itself since then. It is not, of course, that there have been no develop-
ments of any sort. The League of Nations developed, through treaties, basic mechanisms for the 
international protection of human rights. The United Nations, through the Universal Declaration 
and subsequent instruments, created a largely agreed list of human rights, which has had wide 
ramifications in political life. International law now embodies human rights and has developed 
complex institutions of adjudication. And so on. But despite the many changes, none has been 
to the idea itself. The idea is still that of a right we have simply in virtue of being human, with 
no further explanation of what “human” means here.39
Tasioulas, for his part, makes broadly similar claims about the continuity between the 
contemporary idea of human rights (which he identifies, at its core, with a “distinctive 
moral sensibility”) and the natural rights tradition.40
So part of what underlies the Orthodox–Political debate, then, is not so much a his-
torical disagreement as a disagreement about the theoretical significance of (some 
events in) the postwar history of human rights. As such, the debate raises profound 
(and not at all obvious) questions about how and why history matters, as it were, and in 
particular how and why it matters for a philosophical theory of human rights. The two 
main chapters and three commentaries in this first Part of the book set out to answer 
these very questions.
* * *
38 Griffin 2008, p. 29; Tasioulas in this volume, Sec. I.
39 Griffin 2008, p. 13. 40 Tasioulas 2012, p. 26.
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Orthodox and Political theorists take an interest in the history of human rights 
because they believe that evaluating public practice requires historical perspective. 
Theorists on both sides agree that a philosophical conception of “human rights” that 
bears no resemblance to the historically contingent notion that has taken root in 
global politics, law, and society would fail to exert any meaningful critical leverage 
on the latter.41
This failure can be understood in different ways.42 On the one hand, it may be a semantic 
failure: a wildly unfamiliar theory of human rights (one that, say, portrayed them as 
the rights of only a small subset of all living persons) is unlikely to come across as a 
theory of human rights at all; contemporary audiences will intuitively dismiss it as 
“changing the subject”—as confusing apples with oranges.
On the other hand, it may be a failure of focus: a theory interested in determining 
what rights should be recognized by, say, international human rights law (IHRL), 
ought to take account of the real-world (and historically contingent) consequences of 
recognizing rights in that environment. For instance, if we learn that the norms of 
IHRL are meant to be incorporated into domestic and regional law,43 this gives us a 
reason to think that IHRL should recognize rights (like the right to social security) that 
can typically be protected by domestic institutions. In general, a theory that aims to 
evaluate the public practice of human rights needs to keep these and other historically 
contingent features of the practice in focus; otherwise, its recommendations will be “so 
remote from the practice of human rights as to be irrelevant to it.”44
In the first chapter of the volume, Martti Koskenniemi suggests that studying the 
history of human rights is crucial to more than just meaningful philosophical engagement 
with public practice—history is, in fact, a valuable replacement for abstract philosoph-
ical theory. In Koskenniemi’s view, there is not much to be gained from using philo-
sophical reasoning to approach questions about what human rights are, why they 
exist, what they require of us, and how best to enact them in public life. When we try to 
do this, he suggests, even a cursory survey of the philosophical literature will show 
that we run into intellectual dead ends and interminable debates. Against this (gloomy) 
background, Koskenniemi argues that we can look to history as a way out—a way of 
answering some of the questions philosophy puts before us but without becoming 
bogged down in impossible abstractions.
Koskenniemi uses three episodes in the history of human rights (spanning from the 
16th to the 18th centuries) to illustrate what he thinks we can learn, generally speaking, 
from historical analysis. What these episodes show, in his view, is that rights claims, 
even when advanced under the most rigorous philosophical auspices, are ultimately 
tools of politics and a product of historical forces. Rights claims come in on all sides of 
political conflicts—both as a way of challenging entrenched interests and advancing 
them—and so the illuminating thing to understand about rights, Koskenniemi asserts, 
41 Beitz 2009, p. 61; Griffin 2008, p. 29; Raz 2010, p. 324; Tasioulas in this volume, Sec. I.
42 See: Etinson in this volume, Sec. V. 43 See: fn. 18. 44 Raz 2010, p. 323.
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is not how they should be used but rather how they are used, and how they help political 
actors achieve certain ends in concrete historical circumstances.
In her helpful commentary, Annabel Brett suggests that Koskenniemi’s dismissal of 
philosophy is less absolute than he makes it out to be. Brett suggests that Koskenniemi 
is opposed to “legislative” philosophical theories of human rights (theories that tell us 
“what human rights are,” once and for all) but would accept a more speculative type of 
philosophy that offers “an imaginative construction of how human rights might be 
thought of, if we want to make a better world for living in.” If this is a call for epistemically 
modest and historically informed philosophical work, then it should be welcomed. 
But it is hard to see how a philosophical theory of human rights can be purged of any 
“legislative” aspect—that is, any judgment as to how such rights ideally ought to be 
practised and/or understood.
Nor is it clear that Koskenniemi has offered us good reasons for thinking that it 
should. Philosophy may be difficult, and its conclusions subject to seemingly inter-
minable debate, but the same is true of other disciplines, including history. And 
Koskenniemi’s insightful historical observations about the realpolitik functions of 
human rights discourse might plausibly be used as an aid to (rather than as a replacement 
for) normative inquiry into how current legal-political practice might be improved, 
and in particular how it might learn from past mistakes—a claim powerfully defended 
by Pablo Gilabert and C. A. J. Coady in Part V of this volume.
Like Koskenniemi, Samuel Moyn thinks that history provides us with valuable 
insight into the nature and functions of human rights. But unlike Koskenniemi, Moyn 
clearly believes that philosophy has an important role to play here too—at least so long 
as it avoids the dangers of excessive abstraction. Moyn’s request is that philosophers 
approach human rights with the aim of being both faithful and helpful to public practice. 
He asks, of theorists, that they both accurately interpret the publicly shared under-
standing of human rights (in law, politics, and society, etc.), as well as offer suggestions 
about how it might be improved, particularly in ways that will enhance the realization 
of human rights—their transformation of the “world itself.”
In order for philosophical theory to do this, Moyn argues, it needs to be highly alert 
to its historical moment. Philosophers need to think carefully about the historical 
forces that allowed human rights to break out as a popular (or “salient”) idea in the 
past, the factors that have limited their realization or fulfilment thus far, and the cir-
cumstances (and conceptual modifications) that might well allow them to break out as 
a more popular and realizable ideal in the future.
In a sense, then, Moyn wholly agrees with the main participants in the Orthodox–
Political debate: historical awareness is crucial for meaningful critical engagement 
with public practice. But he also highlights a special virtue of such awareness: its 
capacity to help theorists solve the very important practical problem of realizing 
human rights in a recalcitrant world.
Moyn is right to think that philosophy can make an important contribution to 
this task. Philosophical attempts to understand, critique, and reimagine human 
rights can help practitioners set basic goals as well as evaluate different strategies of 
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implementation. But it is not obvious that philosophers should be so interested in 
developing theories of human rights that are palatable to the public at large, or that fit 
with (what we might call) the current historical “zeitgeist,” in the way that Moyn suggests. 
Doing so may (possibly) make philosophical theories of human rights easier to realize, 
but it may also diminish their critical power or normative plausibility.
Furthermore, as John Tasioulas notes in his reply to Moyn, realizing human rights is 
a multi-disciplinary effort. It requires skill, effort, data, favourable circumstance, lead-
ership, institutions, and human ingenuity that vastly outstrip anything philosophical 
insight alone can provide. With that in mind, Moyn’s argument for a philosophy of 
human rights that (with the aid of history) is in charge of transforming both the world 
of ideas and the world itself may seem to trade on an overinflated understanding of the 
discipline.
That said, Moyn’s argument serves as an important provocation for philosophers, 
one that forces them to address productive questions about the role of philosophy in 
the study and advancement of human rights, and about the role of history in philoso-
phy. In his overview of this first Part of the volume, Jeffrey Flynn highlights some of the 
ways in which the disciplinary objectives of history and philosophy can both intersect 
and diverge in the context of human rights.
II. The Orthodox–Political Debate
Part II of the volume takes a direct look at the Orthodox–Political debate itself. The 
debate operates at four different levels, each of which addresses a different set of ques-
tions. These include questions about (i) the nature of human rights, (ii) their grounds, 
(iii) their content, and (iv) the aims and methods of a philosophical theory of human 
rights in general.
These questions are not entirely insulated from one another. If, for example, one 
adopts an Orthodox understanding of (i) the nature of human rights, understanding 
them to be moral rights that we have simply in virtue of being human, this exerts 
 logical pressure on one’s understanding of (ii) and (iii): presumably, the existence of 
such rights will depend on certain facts about human nature (a claim about grounds), 
and only those moral rights that are grounded in such facts will qualify as genuine 
human rights (a claim about content).
So there is a natural order of operations here; it makes good theoretical sense to start 
out by identifying (i) the nature of human rights, and to proceed onwards from there, 
allowing the dominoes to fall accordingly. But philosophical claims about the “nature” 
or “concept” of human rights can be opaque until we say something about their scope 
and purpose, as well as about the kind of evidence that can be marshalled in their 
favour—that is, until we say something about (iv).
For instance, when Orthodox theorists tell us that human rights are moral rights 
that we have simply in virtue of being human, it helps a great deal to know that this 
is not just a brute philosophical stipulation, but rather an attempt to home in on 
an  understanding of human rights that embodies various virtues: (a) historical 
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resonance,45 (b) fidelity to contemporary legal and political practice,46 (c) theoretical 
determinacy,47 (d) broad acceptability,48 and (e) ethical or normative plausibility.49 
Similarly, when Political theorists say that human rights are individual moral rights 
that limit the exercise of national sovereignty, it helps just as much to know that this is 
an attempt to identify the role of “human rights” within the specific context of (b) 
contemporary international politics and law.50
In a sense, these details of scope and purpose form part of the meaning of claims 
about the nature of human rights; they help us understand what such theoretical 
claims ultimately amount to. Furthermore, these meta-theoretical details tell us some-
thing about how to evaluate claims about the nature or concept of human rights—
that is, about the kind of evidence that can be marshalled in their favour, or to their 
discredit. All of this is crucial to making rational engagement possible.
For this very reason, most theorists in fact start by identifying (iv)—the scope, 
purpose, and evidentiary grounds of their theory of human rights—and then move on 
from there. Beitz, Griffin, Raz, and Tasioulas all preface their theoretical claims with 
(meta-theoretical) declarations of aim and approach.
Indeed, Raz and Beitz think that what ultimately distinguishes a Political concep-
tion of human rights from its Orthodox counterpart is its stance on questions of just 
this type (iv). In their view, Political theories of human rights are distinguished not by 
what they say about the basic nature of such rights, but rather by their underlying com-
mitment to saying something that, again, captures the functions attributed to “human 
rights” in contemporary international legal and political practice, whatever these 
ultimately turn out to be.51
This might seem puzzling given that, as already noted, Orthodox theorists like 
Griffin and Tasioulas also appear to share an interest in modelling these functions. 
And puzzling it is. The fact that Beitz and Raz take themselves to be offering not just a 
different philosophical theory, but a fundamentally different kind of philosophical 
theory from their Orthodox counterparts, highlights an important weakness of the 
debate so far. Despite their prefatory focus on questions of aim and approach, partici-
pants in the Orthodox–Political debate have rarely specified just how their answers to 
such questions compare to those of their interlocutors. This has left the debate vulner-
able to basic misunderstanding and cross-talk. And several commentators have seized 
on this in recent years, arguing that Orthodox and Political theories of human rights 
are compatible in ways not recognized by their main proponents.52
The contributions in this second Part of the volume directly address these two cru-
cial levels of the Orthodox–Political debate. First, they address the core question of 
how best to conceive of (i) the nature of human rights. And second, they shed valuable 
45 See: Griffin 2008, ch. 1.   46 See: fn. 38.
47 Griffin 2008, pp. 2, 14–20. 48 Tasioulas in this volume, Sec. I.
49 Griffin 2008, p. 2, 4; Tasioulas in this volume, Sec. I.
50 Raz 2010, p. 327; Beitz 2009, pp. 42–4, 102–6.
51 Idem. 52 Liao & Etinson 2012; Gilabert 2011.
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light on the meta-theoretical issue of (iv) what theorists are really doing (and what they 
should be doing) when they construct a philosophical theory of human rights that 
answers questions of this first sort, and others. Several contributions also address the 
claim that Orthodox and Political theories are at cross-purposes, or ultimately com-
patible with one another.
* * *
Jeremy Waldron’s chapter wrestles directly with the first level of debate. There, the 
key issue, as he puts it, is to figure out what sense to make of the term “human” in 
human rights. Waldron presents us with two broad alternatives, which roughly 
 correspond to the options presented by Orthodox and Political theories but also 
frame them in a new light.
One option is the “human bearer” approach (aka the Orthodox view), which under-
stands human rights as rights born by all persons in virtue of their humanity. The other 
option is the “human concern” approach, which takes human rights to be the proper 
concern of all human agents—a concern that (as the Political view suggests) cannot be 
successfully rebuffed by appeals to national sovereignty.
These alternatives do not exhaust the contemporary theoretical landscape. For one, 
there is a common type of view that is plausibly categorized as “Political”—because it 
defines human rights as rights that serve the overtly political function of setting 
 necessary standards of legitimate governance53—but that does not seem to fit within 
Waldron’s binary schema. Nonetheless, the schema does effectively embrace the lead-
ing theoretical alternatives currently on offer, including those Waldron wants to 
 criticize: Raz and Rawls’s concern-based theories of human rights.
Waldron interestingly points out that debates about the nature of human rights can-
not ultimately be resolved by appeal to the ordinary or everyday meaning of the term. 
He agrees with Raz that, analytically speaking, “the whole field is a bit of a mess.”54 
As Waldron sees it, “The question is not: What does the “human” in “human rights” 
really mean? The question is: what is the more convenient and illuminating use to 
make of the term in this context?”
If we take this point seriously, perhaps we should think of Orthodox and Political 
accounts of human rights as presenting us with something less than a full analytic 
definition thereof—that is, something less than the necessary and sufficient conditions 
under which any right qualifies as a human right. We might instead think of these 
accounts as describing “characteristic” or even contingent features of such rights in 
particular circumstances.55
Even on this score, however, Waldron thinks we should be wary of following Raz 
and Rawls in linking human rights to a specific kind of actionable concern on the part 
53 See: fn. 12.
54 “There is not enough discipline underpinning the use of the term ‘human rights’ to make it a useful 
analytical tool.” (Raz 2010, pp. 336–7.)
55 See: Nickel’s chapter in this volume for one possible way of making sense of this suggestion.
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of others, particularly in the international arena. Waldron’s chapter meticulously high-
lights various costs or “inconveniences” of doing so: costs that include losing sight of 
the individualism of human rights—that is, the normal thought that these are rights 
that every human being, considered as a discrete individual person, can be said to 
have—and the implication of a (false) discontinuity between human rights and consti-
tutional rights. Together, these concerns present a powerful challenge to the Political 
account of human rights, or at least to one version of it.
In his reply, Joseph Raz suggests that Waldron has misunderstood the basic point of 
developing a Political account. Raz denies having any interest in the question of what 
sense should be made of the “human” in human rights, or what the characteristic or 
core features of such rights might be. Instead, he insists that he is strictly interested in 
the legal and political practice of human rights, and in identifying the normative stand-
ards against which that practice should be judged—standards that, he thinks, are not 
(fully) captured by the moral human rights affirmed by Orthodox theorists.
But Raz’s provocative response to Waldron may overstate things. After all, Raz is 
interested in identifying characteristic or core features of human rights; it is just that he 
confines his focus to those “human rights” explicitly recognized in contemporary 
international politics and law. And most importantly, it is not clear that Waldron’s 
focus is any different, particularly given his more general interest in the analysis of legal 
(rather than purely moral) concepts.56
James W. Nickel’s chapter takes a less partisan stance on the Orthodox–Political 
debate. Nickel’s interest is wholly in questions of type (iv). That is, his chapter sheds 
light on the differences in aim and approach that underlie type (i) conceptual disagree-
ments about the nature of human rights—differences of just the kind Raz brings up in 
his reply.
Nickel points out that Orthodox and Political accounts of human rights can plaus-
ibly be seen as having different aims or areas of “focus.” For instance, Griffin’s 
Orthodox theory identifies features or functions (mainly, the protection of normative 
agency) attributable to human rights, understood as a set of authoritative moral norms, 
in any time period. His focus is atemporal.57 It also identifies features that such rights 
would have across a range of contexts of application—or “spheres” of life, as Nickel 
calls them. These include not just international but also domestic and interpersonal 
affairs.58 Political theorists like Rawls, Raz, and Beitz, by contrast, are more constrained 
in their focus. Their theories aim to capture features (such as the limitation of national 
sovereignty) attributable to human rights as they operate in modern times (post-1948), 
and particularly in international politics and law.
Understood in this way, Nickel argues, Orthodox and Political theories might be 
seen as offering compatible and even mutually correct accounts of human rights. But 
unlike some other recent work on the compatibility of Orthodox and Political 
56 See e.g. Waldron 2012, pp. 13–15, to pick one example. 57 Griffin 2008, pp. 50–1.
58 Ibid., p. 170.
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 perspectives on human rights,59 Nickel is careful not to suggest that his observations 
necessarily resolve the debate. Instead, he simply exhorts theorists to be more transparent 
about issues of focus, and to be more sharply aware of how their choice of focus 
compares to that of others—an issue that is all too important if the integrity of current 
philosophical debates is to be maintained going forward.
Adam Etinson’s response casts some doubt on the conciliatory power of Nickel’s 
analysis. Nickel’s chapter implicitly draws on an accommodating master-view of 
human rights on which various orientations of focus are possible. But this master-view 
might be rejected by Political theorists, such as Charles Beitz and John Rawls, who 
think of human rights as (essentially) norms that govern the behaviour of states under 
modern circumstances—that is, as norms that operate in the contemporary inter-
national domain exclusively. In this respect, Nickel’s analysis may be more of a partici-
pant in the Orthodox–Political debate than it pretends to be.
This does not stop Nickel’s analysis from providing significant insight. And Etinson’s 
commentary deliberately uses it to shed light on the meaning, justification, and 
importance of a poorly understood feature of the Orthodox–Political debate: the 
(ubiquitous) notion that philosophical theories of human rights should be “faithful to 
the practice” thereof. Etinson identifies and critically examines two independent 
arguments for this notion—one based on semantic, and the other on focus-related 
considerations of just the kind explored by Nickel.
Andrea Sangiovanni’s chapter ambitiously covers questions of type (i) and (iv). Its most 
striking contribution is the addition of an alternative to the Orthodox and Political 
accounts of human rights: what Sangiovanni calls the “Broad View.” The Broad View of 
human rights is distinguished by its accommodating power (hence the label). Its core 
conceptual claim (i) is that human rights are “those moral rights that ought to be of 
universal moral, legal, and political concern.” So Sangiovanni seems to offer us a version 
of what Waldron calls the “human concern” approach to human rights.
But the type of “concern” at issue here is far more open-ended than it is on Waldron’s 
view. Since many types of moral rights should plausibly concern us all, some human 
rights, according to the Broad View, will be moral rights that we have simply in virtue 
of being human (Orthodox), and others will be moral rights that limit the exercise of 
national sovereignty (Political). Human rights include rights of both these types, and 
more. In this way, the Broad View subsumes its Orthodox and Political counterparts.
Sangiovanni offers an array of interesting reasons for adopting this exceedingly 
broad understanding of human rights. But one of its key motivations is the diversity 
and breadth of human rights practice itself. Like Orthodox and Political theorists, 
Sangiovanni believes that a theory of human rights ought to be adequately faithful to 
the practice thereof. Unlike those theorists, however, he believes that the practice is too 
broad and diverse to be captured by any concept of human rights as specific as those of 
Orthodox and Political views.60
59 See fn. 52.   60 See Tadros 2015 (p. 445), for a similar point.
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Some practitioners have little interest in whether or not the rights they affirm are 
grounded in considerations of humanity. Others will have little interest in whether 
they override considerations of sovereignty. And there is nothing wrong with this; 
in Sangiovanni’s view, there simply is no deep moral unity underlying the various 
activities and interests of human rights practitioners.
This is a provocative claim. It questions an assumption that seems to be widely 
shared in the Orthodox–Political debate: that there is a single (reasonably specific) 
concept of human rights governing the “practice.” At the very least, Sangiovanni is 
right to flag this assumption as one worthy of serious examination.
But the Broad View faces challenges of its own. One is, ironically, a problem of fidelity. 
The theory is so deliberately vague and open-ended that it seems to stretch well beyond 
any normal sense of the boundaries of human rights talk itself. For instance, since the 
welfare of animals is plausibly of universal moral concern, Sangiovanni’s theory will 
include non-human animals among the bearers of human rights—a highly counterin-
tuitive result. Other worries about the extraordinary breadth of the view are high-
lighted by Rainer Forst in his incisive commentary.
III. Morality and Law
The major instruments of human rights law (whether domestic, regional, or inter-
national) are often thought of as vehicles for the implementation of pre-existent moral 
rights. There are various reasons why this is so.
First, it is undergirded by the apparent “suprapositivity”61 of human rights—their 
possession of a normative authority (i.e. a moral existence or validity) that transcends 
their embodiment in law. As mentioned in Section I of this Introduction, the human 
right not to be enslaved seems to have just this type of authority. We have a duty to 
respect it even if the law fails to acknowledge as much. And it is natural to say the same 
about many other human rights as well. This opens up the possibility that human rights 
can motivate or justify their own legal embodiment; their suprapositivity makes them 
capable, at least in principle, of calling for the creation of law, rather than just being 
creatures of it.
A second key observation is that human rights law portrays itself as a medium for 
the enactment of suprapositive rights. The two core instruments of international 
human rights law (the ICCPR and ICESCR), for instance, both present themselves as 
engaged in the “recognition”—rather than the creation or stipulation—of human 
rights: “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”62 And 
these rights are said to “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”63 This 
claim seems to imply that international human rights law is grounded in a moral status 
61 Neuman 2003, p. 1868. See also: Cruft, Liao, & Renzo 2015, p. 5; Griffin 2008, p. 54.
62 ICCPR, Preamble; ICESCR, Preamble. 63 ICCPR, Preamble; ICESCR, Preamble.
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or value that exists beyond it (hence its “inherence”), and that gains expression and 
protection through it.64
In addition to all of this, thinking of human rights law as a vehicle for the implemen-
tation of human rights morality is a very natural way of understanding its function as a 
distinct area of law. Generally speaking, areas of law are developed in response to, and 
defined by their service of, certain identifiable needs. International Aviation Law, for 
instance, addresses the need for universal standards governing air travel, air traffic 
safety, and associated activities.
In the case of human rights law, broadly speaking, the relevant need seems to be that 
of articulating, enforcing, regulating, and monitoring compliance with human rights, 
understood as (among other things) a set of pressing moral rights that require univer-
sal recognition. This is not the only way of understanding the distinctive role of human 
rights law, nor are these the only reasons for doing so, but it is a natural view that many 
philosophers, lawyers, and legal theorists have found attractive.65
However natural this thought may be, the relationship between human rights mor-
ality and law has come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Two questions in par-
ticular have received special attention. First, there has been controversy over whether 
(a) all moral human rights require legal recognition. And second, there has been some 
discussion about whether (b) only moral human rights can justify the enactment of 
legal human rights—that is, about whether human rights law serves justifiable pur-
poses beyond that of implementing human rights morality.
The first claim (a) has received considerable and longstanding support.66 According 
to many, moral human rights—and indeed, moral rights in general67—are something 
like “laws in waiting.”68 They are the kind of moral norms that ought to be incorporated 
into law and coercively enforced, if they are not already.
As already mentioned in this introduction, however, not all moral human rights 
seem worthy of legal recognition. Consider, again, the right (among spouses) to an 
equal or fair say in important family decisions.69 This certainly seems like a human 
right—one that all human beings are entitled to—but it nonetheless appears unworthy 
of legal recognition. Not only would it be extremely difficult for courts of law to adju-
dicate a right of this sort, such adjudication would interfere with the privacy of family 
life in ways that seem more broadly damaging or inappropriate. Similar concerns come 
up in the case of other plausible human rights, such as the right of mature children to 
64 There is plenty of room for disagreement here. (See e.g. Waldron 2012 and Waldron 2015, who thinks 
of human dignity as a principally legal doctrine.) I am simply articulating what I take to be a natural reading 
of this claim.
65 See e.g. Cranston 1983 pp. 16–17; Griffin 2010, p. 353; Lauterpacht 1950, p. 74; Neuman 2003, 
pp. 1868–9; Nickel 2007, p. 10; Wellman 2011, ch. 4.
66 See e.g. Cranston 1983, p. 16; Hart 1955, pp. 177–8; Habermas 2010, p. 470; Martin 1989, p. 83.
67 Hart 1955. 68 The phrase is from Sen 2004, p. 326.
69 The example is borrowed from Tasioulas 2012, p. 2.
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(parental) respect for their autonomy,70 or the right of all human beings to respect 
in general.71
There is a way in which these examples can be accommodated by (a). Much depends 
on how we interpret the normative strength of the claim. If (a) is read strongly, as 
asserting that there is always a conclusive case in favour of positivizing any moral 
human right, then the prospect of accommodation is closed, and we have to decide 
whether to reject the examples or to reject (a).
On the other hand, if the claim is read more weakly, as suggesting only that there is 
always a pro tanto or prima facie case in favour of positivizing any moral human right, 
then the possibility of accommodation remains open. Indeed, arguably, the examples 
cited above are simply ones in which pro tanto reasons in favour of legal positivization 
are defeated by weighty concerns about justiciability, appropriate forms of punish-
ment, and/or the value of privacy, etc. Perhaps there always is a pro tanto case in favour 
of legally recognizing moral human rights—or any moral right, for that matter—just 
not always a conclusive one.
While this conciliatory strategy might work, at least in principle, it is not clear that 
it provides us with insight into the thinking of any actual proponent of (a). This is 
because authors that defend (a) have rarely specified its strength—that is, whether 
they endorse the weak or strong version thereof. Jürgen Habermas, for instance, says 
variously that human rights are “oriented” towards, “designed” for, and uniquely 
amenable to institutionalization and coercive enforcement.72 But none of this really 
clarifies the normative strength of their alleged legalistic orientation.
There is no absolute need for reconciliation here of course. One plausible reaction 
to the examples is simply to reject (a) in both its weak and strong forms. And, indeed, 
if the examples are convincing, this may well be the more plausible way to go. After all, 
it is not obvious that there is even a pro tanto case to be made in favour of legally imple-
menting the right to an equal or fair say in important family decisions, and considerably 
less obvious that this right is somehow a “law in waiting,” uniquely oriented towards or 
designed for coercive legal enforcement.
Instead, we might take the examples to illustrate the plausibility of adopting a less 
legalistic understanding of moral human rights, and of moral rights in general. On one 
such understanding, a moral right simply identifies what some duty-bearer(s) owe, or 
are morally required to provide, to some right-holder(s). The question of whether (and 
how) that duty should be enforced by third parties is left entirely open to additional 
argument and circumstances. On another such understanding, moral rights do neces-
sarily call for some form of third-party (i.e. social or institutional) enforcement, but 
not necessarily legal enforcement in particular. Perhaps in many or most instances 
legal measures will be appropriate, but in others we may find that enforcement via less 
formal social customs and attitudes is more advantageous.
70 Griffin 2010, pp. 354–5. 71 Buchanan & Sreenivasan in this volume, Sec. 4.
72 Habermas 2010, p. 470.
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This last understanding of moral rights has a strong following and dates at least as 
far back as John Stuart Mill.73 When applied to moral human rights in particular, it 
makes ample room for the diversity of ways in which human rights find recognition 
and protection in the real world: through monitoring and information-sharing, public 
criticism and condemnation (or so-called “jawboning”),74 popular mobilization, and 
other informal mechanisms. As Tasioulas mentions in this volume, the widely 
endorsed 2011 “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,” developed by 
Professor John Ruggie, are a good example of this.75 These principles assign ambitious 
responsibilities for respecting human rights to business corporations, but they do not 
establish legal obligations of any sort. Rather, they aim to be effective by setting clear 
behavioural expectations that can serve as a focal point for social and political action.
The Millian understanding of moral rights is still compatible with their having some 
special orientation towards law. For instance, we might think of moral human rights as 
generally deserving (as a statistical and contingent matter) of legal recognition, or we 
might single out some subset of moral human rights as deserving of legal recognition, 
even if we accept that not all human rights are.76
The contributions in this third Part of the volume do not challenge the idea that 
moral human rights may call for diverse (potentially non-legal) forms of recognition, 
protection, and implementation. Their focus is instead on the moral functions of legal 
human rights—those human rights that are recognized in law. They approach this 
topic in two main ways. First, they examine whether (b) these functions are restricted 
to that of expressing correspondent moral human rights, or whether they include 
more than this. And second, they offer an account of the specific values realized by 
various systematic features of human rights law. Both of these projects offer a macro-
scopic supplement to well-known work on the value (and disvalue) of particular legal 
human rights, including the right to health,77 the right to democracy,78 and the right to 
periodic holidays with pay,79 among many others.
* * *
Allen Buchanan and Gopal Sreenivasan’s discussion starts from the assumption that 
international human rights law (IHRL) is an instrument or tool, one that serves a variety 
of moral purposes. Against the grain of the suggestion made earlier in this Section of 
the Introduction, however, they argue that the implementation of pre-existent moral 
human rights is not an essential part of what IHRL does.
73 Mill 1989, p. 14; Sen 2004, pp. 320–8; Tasioulas 2012, p. 2. 74 Nickel 2006, pp. 271–4.
75 Tasioulas in this volume, Sec. III.
76 One view on which any such affirmation is impossible is that of Samantha Besson, according to 
whom moral human rights only exist once they have been given legal recognition. On this view, in other 
words, moral human rights are “children” rather than “parents” of their legal counterparts. See: Besson 2011.
77 Brownlee 2015; Hassoun 2015; Wolff 2012.
78 Benhabib 2011; Christiano 2011; Cohen 2010; Gilabert 2012.
79 Cranston 1983, pp. 7, 12–13; Griffin 2008, p. 209; Risse 2009; Waldron 1993, pp. 12–13.
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In their view, IHRL consists in a set of legal entitlements that: (i) individuals hold 
primarily against their state; (ii) become binding on states through a process of ratifi-
cation; and (iii) can limit the exercise of sovereignty even within a state’s own borders. 
Given that there might plausibly be a wide range of moral reasons to enact any given 
legal entitlement of this sort—as discussed in the case of the right to health—Buchanan 
and Sreenivasan argue that there is no reason why these entitlements should be limited 
to ones that correspond to pre-existent moral human rights, or even to moral rights in 
general. Thus, they deny (b), or what they call “the mirroring view”: the idea that the 
only justifiable moral reason for enacting an international legal human right is that it 
corresponds to a pre-existent moral human right of similar content and character.80
In denying (b), Buchanan and Sreenivasan take themselves to be overturning a 
kind of orthodoxy within the philosophy of human rights, one that cuts across the 
Orthodox–Political divide. And indeed, to the extent that rejecting (b) involves rejecting 
the intuitive idea that legal human rights are a vehicle for the expression and protection 
of pre-existent moral human rights, Buchanan and Sreenivasan do reject a commonly 
held view.
But there is in fact little reason to think that this commonly held view stands or falls 
on the truth of (b). IHRL can be a vehicle for the expression, recognition, and enforce-
ment of pre-existent moral human rights—indeed, this can even be its characteristic 
purpose, or most of what it does—even if it is sometimes justifiable to enact a legal 
human right that has no obvious moral counterpart. We may even find, as Erasmus Mayr 
suggests in his comments, that justifiable international legal human rights always do 
express corresponding moral human rights, despite this not being a strict or straight-
forward necessity. There is no logical contradiction here. Nor is it clear that any actual 
author holds the restrictive “mirroring view” (b).81 But even if Buchanan and Sreenivasan 
overestimate the revisionary nature of their position, their discussion helpfully identifies 
some of the central complexities involved in morally evaluating the content and struc-
ture of IHRL.
Mattias Kumm’s chapter takes on just this evaluative task. His interest is in diagnosing 
the “moral point” of three structural or pervasive features of human rights law, with a 
special focus on the European system in particular. These features include: (i) the broad 
scope of legal human rights—their guarantee of much more than just minimally decent 
forms of existence; (ii) the fact that some legal human rights are regarded as subject to 
justifiable infringement, provided certain proportionality requirements are met; and 
(iii) the extensive variation both in terms of the formulation and judicial inter-
pretation of human rights across jurisdictions and strata of human rights law.
Kumm’s central suggestion is that we should interpret these practices as mandated 
by a conception of justice centered on the idea of a universal “right to justification”—a 
80 Also see: Buchanan 2013, pp. 14–23.
81 Griffin, who Buchanan and Sreenivasan suggest can “naturally” be read as holding this view, explicitly 
denies it in at least one instance: Griffin 2010, p. 351. So too does Raz in this volume.
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constructivist principle of Kantian inspiration that has recently been championed by 
Rainer Forst.82 According to this basic right or principle of justice, political and legal 
institutions ought to be constructed in accordance with norms that free and equal per-
sons can reasonably be expected to accept. For Kumm, legal human rights are a crucial 
vehicle through which the content of such norms is decided and expressed. And this 
makes them not only a central part of politics and law but also a key object of reasonable 
disagreement themselves. It is this (moral) centrality and (epistemic) contestability, 
Kumm suggests, that explains both the origin and value of features (i), (ii), and (iii) 
above: the broad invocation of human rights; their curtailment in cases of conflicting 
objectives; and extensive disagreement about their content.
Kumm presents this account as the “best justification” of the practice we have, not 
just as one possible moral justification thereof. In order to successfully demonstrate 
this, however, Kumm not only has to address possible gaps between his constructivist 
principle and the practices he seeks to vindicate—gaps that Samantha Besson, in her 
commentary, insists are real; he also needs to address other possible ways of justifying 
(i), (ii), and (iii). And this includes offering some argument to those who are not 
already convinced that Kantian constructivism (or some version thereof) provides the 
best framework for thinking about justice in general.
Kumm’s analysis is further complicated by a simultaneous interest in both moral 
justification (the value of x) and historical explanation (the origins of x). Though it may 
only do so implicitly, Kumm’s chapter attempts to uncover a logic that both justifies 
and explains key features of contemporary human rights practice. These are two very 
different tasks, however, and Kumm rarely engages in the kind of historical evidence-
gathering (e.g. about the intentions of key drafters, politicians, judges, and practitioners, 
etc.) necessary to accomplish the latter. In fairness, Kumm admits that his account 
offers only the beginnings of a complete argument. And in the meantime, it outlines an 
impressively comprehensive framework for evaluating human rights law.
Andreas Follesdal’s chapter, like Kumm’s, has a strong European focus. But Follesdal’s 
interest is in gauging the value of a more singular and specific legal phenomenon: the 
so-called “Margin of Appreciation” (MA) doctrine famously practised by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The MA requires the ECtHR to show a degree of 
deference, under certain conditions, to the judgement of a domestic authority when 
determining whether it is in compliance with its treaty obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In so doing, the doctrine effectively allows for 
member states to interpret and implement the ECHR in different ways. And for this 
reason it has been an object of both strong praise and condemnation.83 Follesdal nimbly 
explores a broad array of arguments on either side, but his leading hypothesis is that 
the leeway it provides can be justified by a general principle of respect for democracy, 
and particularly for democratic decision-making at the domestic level.
82 See: Forst 2012.   83 See e.g. Benvenisti 1999; Letsas 2006; Shany 2006; Wilkins 2002.
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This justification has its limits, however. As Follesdal explains, when there is no 
good evidence to suggest that a state’s action, law, or policy is backed by genuinely 
democratic support, or if basic democratic rights are themselves at stake, the ECtHR 
should refuse to grant the state a MA on that issue. In such “undemocratic” situations, 
the principle of respect for democracy no longer speaks in favour of the MA, and may 
indeed prohibit it.
Follesdal’s account has the advantage of being valuably specific about what it is that 
makes the MA an attractive doctrine; he avoids the natural temptation of simply 
grounding this on the broad value of national “sovereignty”—indeed, as George Letsas 
suggests in his extensive commentary, a case built on respect for sovereignty may fail 
outright. But Follesdal’s account also faces some hurdles. It is not easy, after all, to 
measure the democratic character of a judicial decision, piece of legislation, let alone 
of an entire state. Judges, for one, are often appointed rather than elected, making their 
democratic credentials especially hard to assess. And even if we want regional courts 
like the ECtHR to be making these kinds of measurements, there is a serious risk 
that very few actual states will qualify as sufficiently democratic to be granted an MA—
that is, unless the bar is set quite low. The risk here is that justifiable applications of the 
MA would be so rare as to render the doctrine almost practically irrelevant.
IV. Ideals and their Limits
Human rights are ideals. They set standards of conduct (and also of belief, attitude, and 
emotion)84 to which various agents are expected to conform. But how demanding are 
human rights? How far must we travel, as it were, to fulfil them? Is this even possible? 
For a volume that is about the relationship between the normative reality of human 
rights, on the one hand, and their imbrication in the concrete worlds of law, politics, 
and popular morality, on the other, these are central questions.
Most theorists agree that human rights are subject to a “practicability” or “feasibil-
ity” test. And a key reason for this is the plausibility of the common assumption that 
“ought implies can”—that a person or institution cannot be obligated to do the impos-
sible.85 For example, one can hardly be obligated to rescue a child that is drowning on 
the other side of the planet. The sheer physical impossibility of such an act makes it an 
implausible object of duty. But human rights are standardly understood to correlate 
with duties; without duties, there can be no rights. And so human rights are naturally 
subject to such concerns about feasibility. As Maurice Cranston, one of the earliest 
authors to write on this topic, explains: “If it is impossible for a thing to be done, it is 
absurd to claim it as a right.”86
84 Not only is the UDHR framed (at least partly) as an educational document to be used for teaching or 
promoting belief in human rights, it also aims to promote certain moral attitudes: Article 1, for instance, 
demands that all human beings “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (my emphasis). For a 
defence of the idea that love is a requirement of human rights, see Liao 2015.
85 For a classic critique, see: Sinnott-Armstrong 1984. 86 Cranston 1973, p. 66.
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But even if we accept the idea that human rights must be feasible, we can still reason-
ably ask how feasible they must be. Cranston himself believes that a genuine human 
right must be achievable (a) for all persons (b) today. For example, since (in his view) 
the widely proclaimed human right to periodic holidays with pay satisfies neither of 
these conditions, it is not a genuine human right.87
But this is an implausibly strong test. Even the universally recognized human 
right to bodily security seems likely to fail it, given that part of what this right 
requires is adequate institutional protection against attack (via effective law enforce-
ment, legislative action, a competent criminal justice system, etc.), and providing 
this for every last person on the planet is probably not possible today, though it may 
one day be so.
The alternative is to adopt some weaker version of the feasibility test. And there is 
good reason to think that it should be quite a bit more flexible than Cranston’s. One 
reason to think so is that there are often concrete steps that can be taken to make pres-
ently infeasible rights feasible in the near or distant future. For example, even if we 
cannot currently grant the human right to periodic holidays with pay to all persons, 
there are still steps (through advocacy, institution building, campaigning, etc.) that we 
can take today to make this a more universally realizable right in the future. When 
such steps are possible, when a right has this partial degree of feasibility, it seems feasible 
enough to perform the basic functions of (and thus count as a legitimate instance of) a 
right: it can assign meaningful and actionable duties to agents, even if these duties have 
an essentially forward-looking character.
Indeed, several authors have taken these observations to be grounds for thinking 
that human rights generate two distinct categories of duties: (i) “direct” duties to respect 
or fulfil human rights, and (ii) “indirect” duties to make respecting or fulfilling them a 
more feasible task in the future.88
The contributions in this fourth Part of the volume tackle two outstanding questions 
in this area of debate. First, they examine the common line of thought defended just 
above—that is, the idea that human rights must be feasible in at least some sense. And 
second, they ask how human rights can have the sort of dualistic normative character 
described just a moment ago. How can human rights both require (i) full and immedi-
ate respect or satisfaction (as in the case of, say, the right not to be tortured) while also 
setting (ii) long-term goals towards which we are expected to work in an incremental 
fashion (as in the case of, say, the right to periodic holidays with pay)? Is there any 
fundamental incoherence here?
* * *
87 Cranston 1973, p. 66. The right is recognized in the UDHR, Article 24, and the ICESCR, Article 7(d).
88 See: Beitz 2009, p. 121; Gilabert 2009, pp. 676–8. The distinction maps on fairly well to the juridical 
distinction between “minimum core” and “progressive realization” rights. See: Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, “General Comment No. 3” (1990).
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Kimberley Brownlee’s chapter takes on the first of these questions. Against the grain of 
a good deal of contemporary theory,89 Brownlee argues that human rights need not 
pass any feasibility test, weak or strong. This is because, as she argues, contrary to what 
most assume, human rights do not need to be feasible in order to meaningfully and 
legitimately guide action; there is, in other words, nothing particularly “absurd” about 
claiming a right to the impossible. Indeed, as she explains, there are in fact many ideals 
that are unattainable and yet fully capable of guiding action.
One example, in her view, is the ideal of being a good parent, which she takes to be a 
so-called “sustainability ideal” in that it requires sustained fulfilment. It is of course 
impossible to always be a good parent. Even the very best parent will suffer intermit-
tent lapses. And yet, it seems obvious that the ideal of being a good parent, suitably 
fleshed out, can serve as a meaningful and worthy guide to action nonetheless. 
Brownlee’s claim is that human rights are like this too. Like sustainability ideals, they 
require continuous respect or satisfaction—which, as she explains, is impossible. Even 
if a government can succeed for a time at fully securing its citizens’ human rights to, 
say, political participation and due process, “there will inevitably be circumstances in 
which some people are either denied due process or illegitimately disenfranchised due 
to errors or prejudices.” But these inevitable lapses, and the consequent unattainability 
of human rights ideals, do not undermine their action-guiding character. Thus, not 
only are human rights infeasible, their being so is little cause for concern.
Brownlee’s argument moves from the observation that (a) flawless compliance with 
human rights is impossible to the assumption that (b) compliance with human rights is 
infeasible simpliciter. But this move may be too quick. As Rowan Cruft points out in his 
response to Brownlee, even if full or perfect compliance with human rights is impossible, 
this would not rule out their being feasible in other “lesser” ways. Indeed, if it were not 
at least possible to approximate human rights ideals—like those of sustainably securing 
citizens’ rights to political participation and due process—then, as Cranston points 
out, it would hardly seem rational to pursue them.
So there is reason to think that even Brownlee’s understanding of human rights 
requires that they be feasible in some respect, which undermines her attempt to tran-
scend contemporary debates about the stringency of the feasibility test altogether. Even 
if this is correct, however, it still leaves intact her provocative suggestion that full respect 
for human rights is an ideal out of reach for human individuals and institutions.
The main goal of Elizabeth Ashford’s chapter is to defend subsistence rights (to 
basic food, housing, healthcare, etc.) against those who would dismiss them as 
“secondary” or even counterfeit (“manifesto”) human rights.90 Attacks of this sort 
have been advanced on various grounds, but Ashford’s interest is in those grounded 
in the (apparent) non-urgency of subsistence rights, particularly when compared 
with traditional liberty rights.
89 See: Gilabert 2009 for an excellent overview.
90 See e.g. Cranston 1973, ch. 8; Feinberg 1970, pp. 254–6; O’Neill 2005.
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As she points out, liberty rights (like the right not to be tortured) have an obvious 
air of urgency about them: they are rights of the utmost moral priority and must be 
immediately complied with. However, subsistence rights (like the right to adequate 
healthcare) appear to have a more aspirational character: they are rights towards 
which we are meant to work, in a progressive, step-by-step manner. The concern, 
then, is that subsistence rights generate goal-like duties of type (ii) rather than 
 genuine rights-based duties of type (i) and that, because of this, including them in 
standard lists of human rights risks “diluting” the moral force thereof. With subsistence 
rights in the mix, human rights appear to lack consistent moral urgency, and may 
(all too conveniently) be glossed over as rights that can be “deferred” as long-term 
projects in the works.
Ashford addresses these concerns in two main ways. First, she argues that subsistence 
or welfare rights are not alone in having an aspirational component. As mentioned, 
protecting liberty rights (such as the right to bodily security) is just as much of a long-
term, progressively realizable project as is securing the means of subsistence for all. 
The development of an effective criminal justice system is a complex, incremental, and 
resource-intensive task. So, even if the aspirational aspect of human rights is some-
thing to lament, subsistence or welfare rights are not solely responsible for it.
Second, Ashford argues that, like other human rights, subsistence rights combine 
both aspirational and peremptory components. As she explains, developing Shue’s 
tripartite analysis of rights,91 (a) the institutionalized protection of individuals against 
life-threatening deprivation may be a long-term project, but (b) the duty not to deprive, 
and (c) certain instances of the duty to aid the deprived, are “primary” duties of the 
utmost moral urgency, on par (in Ashford’s view) with the duty not to torture.
Thus, the best way to avoid casting all human rights under the glow of their aspir-
ational component is to be more clear-eyed and discerning about the variety of duties 
they are capable of generating. Ashford makes a good case for this variety, and also for 
the urgency of coordinated action and institution-building that addresses global 
subsistence needs today. But she leaves untouched the complicated question of what 
individuals are concretely required to do (e.g. advocate, vote, mobilize, aid, donate, etc.), 
and how much is required of them, in light of these obligations—a crucial next step in 
her analysis. Among its other valuable contributions, Daniel Weinstock’s commentary 
helpfully illustrates some of the practical uncertainties we are likely to face here.
V. The Challenges of Politics
Part IV addressed the question of whether, and to what extent, human rights are 
constrained by facts about what is feasible or possible for (would be) duty-bearers. If, 
as many believe, human rights are so constrained, then it is likely that political facts will 
be included in this set.92 It would be strange if human rights required the politically 
91 Shue 1996a.   92 See: Gilabert 2009, pp. 664–7.
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impossible or even unworkable: for instance, government by perfect consensus in 
large-scale societies.
But political facts do more than just limit the scope of what human rights can 
sensibly require. Human rights, on any familiar understanding, require political 
recognition and institutional enactment. And, for better or worse, they are pursued by 
actors that must navigate a world shaped by the forces of politics, warts and all. As 
such, human rights face a number of political challenges: not only is (a) their content 
constrained by the limits of political or institutional possibility; even once their con-
tent is decided, (b) their realization depends, to a substantial degree, on their political 
fortunes; and, more broadly, (c) the formulation and pursuit of human rights inevit-
ably have political consequences, and may be subject to dangerous political pitfalls, 
that merit serious consideration.
One of the more widely discussed political challenges facing human rights is (b): the 
fact that their satisfaction depends (at least in part) on the will and capacity of political 
agents, particularly nation-states. The challenge is a grave one, especially if it is true 
that, as many believe, even when states do have the ability to comply with human 
rights, the political will is rarely there.
One popular argument for this cynical conclusion is furnished by so-called “realist” 
presuppositions about the behaviour of states in the international domain. According 
to realist theories of international relations, states act entirely in accordance with their 
perceived self-interest. And since there is currently no global human rights enforcer 
capable of making compliance with (costly) human rights standards a reliably rational 
choice for self-interested state actors, realists conclude (what is already supported, in 
their view, by considerable independent evidence) that states lack the will to comply 
therewith.93 The overall implication is that, however morally appealing they may be, 
human rights will be politically neglected for the forseeable future.
In recent years, several prominent scholars of international law have challenged this 
realist picture. For instance, Beth Simmons has argued that state compliance with 
international human rights standards can be incentivized even in the absence of 
global enforcement mechanisms, such as foreign intervention, international sanctions, 
monitoring, and public condemnation, etc. As she explains, domestic mobilization—
public protest, grassroots activism, litigation, lobbying, etc.—can act as a powerful 
enforcement mechanism of its own.94
In other work, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have argued that the (“soft”) power 
of acculturation—essentially a form of peer pressure that operates within the inter-
national community—has been and can be a crucial factor promoting compliance 
with international human rights law.95 If these scholars are right, then we can more or 
less accept the realist’s Machiavellian assessment of the motivating sources of state 
93 See: Beitz 1979, pp. 11–67, and Coady 2008, ch. 1, for excellent discussions. For a recent example of a 
realist perspective on human rights, see: Posner 2014.
94 Simmons 2009. 95 Goodman & Jinks 2013.
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behaviour, as well as acknowledge the lack of (coercive or “hard”) power backing 
compliance with human rights at the international level, without concluding that 
human rights standards are doomed to be shirked by state actors; the reality would be 
more complicated and hopeful than that.
Realism has been used to highlight other political challenges for human rights as 
well. Most prominently, realists have suggested that human rights standards are not 
only flouted but also manipulated by states in ways that further their self-interest. For 
instance, it is often said that human rights—or, rather, claims about the violation 
thereof—are (and have been) used by powerful states to justify aggressive international 
actions that, at bottom, are motivated by the prospect of material and/or political self-
gain.96 Here the concern is not, as it was just above, that human rights are politically 
impotent. On the contrary, the concern is that human rights are, in a sense, all too 
effective in politics, or rather effective in the wrong way. If we think of the manipula-
tion of human rights by state actors as a (potentially ever-present) risk, this looks like a 
political challenge of type (c): that is, a dangerous political pitfall that afflicts their 
international formulation and pursuit.
These are two key political challenges for human rights. There are of course many 
others—including Rawlsian concerns about the need for a stable international consen-
sus on human rights.97 The contributions in this fifth Part of the volume catalogue, in 
illuminatingly fine-grained detail, the immense variety of political challenges in this 
area. But just as important as this, and against the (highly polemical) grain of scholar-
ship on this topic, they also devote constructive attention to the question of what impli-
cations we should draw from these challenges: that is, the question of what these 
challenges ultimately mean for the theory and practice of human rights, and what, if 
anything, can and should be done about them.
Is the manipulation and disregard for human rights by political agents a defect of the 
rights themselves or (perhaps more plausibly) of human beings and political institu-
tions? Does the regularity of such events imply, as Raymond Geuss has suggested, that 
human rights are merely a “kind of puffery or white magic”?98 Do states that have a (e.g. 
colonial) history of manipulating human rights standards to their own political advan-
tage lose the moral standing to promote human rights internationally today?99 Are the 
political challenges facing human rights surmountable, manageable, or intractable? 
And if they are not intractable, how should they be met?
* * *
Pablo Gilabert’s chapter develops a constructive analysis of the normative and theoret-
ical implications of what he calls “power-related” worries about human rights. Having 
observed that human rights are both shirked and manipulated by powerful political 
96 See e.g. Douzinas 2007; Mutua 2002, esp. ch. 1; Zolo 2010, esp. pp. 563–5.
97 Rawls 1999, esp. pp. 121–3; Cohen 2004. 98 Geuss 2001, p. 144.
99 My thanks to Rowan Cruft for raising this question.
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agents with alarming regularity, Gilabert notes that we can respond to this fact in three 
general ways.
First, we can think of it, as Geuss does, as an indication that human rights do 
not exist (normatively speaking)—that is, that they do not qualify as norms that we 
genuinely ought to respect. Second, we can think of it as an indication that human 
rights “practice”—broadly, the modern project of explicitly recognizing and promot-
ing human rights in international law and politics—should be abandoned. And third, 
we can think of it as an indication that human rights practice ought to be (re)shaped in 
ways that address concerns about its political neglect, subversion, and abuse.
Gilabert favours the third response. The first, he thinks, is indefensible. Not only 
does it (very implausibly) assume that states can rid themselves of the moral obligation 
to respect human rights by regularly shirking it, it also fits poorly with the general tone 
of scholarship on this topic. In nearly all cases, authors that document the abuse, neg-
lect, and manipulation of human rights by the powerful treat this as a lamentable fact. 
And presumably this is because, at bottom, they believe that human rights (or some-
thing very much like them) exist—that is, that states really ought to do the sort of 
things that human rights typically require of them, such as grant fair trials, refrain 
from torture, tolerate dissent, and offer basic services, etc.
Gilabert also finds the second response uncalled for. As he suggests, there is, as of 
yet, simply not enough evidence available to know whether human rights practice 
merits abandonment: whether overall it has done more harm than good, or whether 
(even if it has) it will clearly continue to do so.
In order to develop and give substance to the third response, Gilabert looks at a var-
iety of power-related concerns about human rights, and tries to see how the practice 
might be reshaped in ways that address them. The chapter identifies a number of help-
ful desiderata of this sort. But perhaps its key observation is that power should not 
simply be seen, as it often is, as an obstacle to be constrained and eventually overcome, 
but also as something that the practice ought to harness and distribute in ways that 
help fulfil the promise of human rights.
Gilabert thinks empowerment should be “built into” the human rights project. Not 
only should individuals and groups be empowered (i.e. provided with the means) to 
acquire the objects of their human rights; they should also be able to play an active role 
in their elaboration and identification. Thus, political rights to equal representation 
and participation—to have one’s voice “heard” in the public domain—should be seen 
as a central part of the human rights project, in Gilabert’s view.
In her comments, Elizabeth Frazer argues that political rights will have to be supple-
mented by political knowledge—particularly knowledge of complex “power struc-
tures” that perpetuate various forms of domination in society—if Gilabert’s democratic 
vision is ever to be achieved. That seems right, but Gilabert’s proposal requires other 
forms of supplementation as well. While individual democratic rights (and political 
knowledge) are a sensible way of addressing concerns about various imbalances of 
power within the domestic context of the nation-state, it is not obvious how they are 
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meant to work at the international level, where the prospect of genuinely democratic 
institutions is hugely remote, and which is the focus of so many of the worries Gilabert 
sets out to address in the first place.
C. A. J. Coady’s chapter explores some of the political and moral risks (“hazards”) 
involved in efforts to implement human rights through acts of rescue, whether in the 
form of aid or military intervention. Coady identifies a number of such risks, which he 
labels “moralisms.” Moralisms are, in essence, moral beliefs and practices that fail to 
take account of relevant prudential considerations. In the context of rescue, Coady 
argues, with the help of powerful historical examples, that we ought to be particularly 
careful to avoid pitfalls like the moralism of “deluded power” (which involves the false 
belief that moral conviction on its own has the power to do substantial good in the 
world), of “unbalanced focus” (which involves an undue fixation on some moral con-
siderations at the expense of others), of “abstraction” (which involves insufficient 
attention to the concrete circumstances in which one aims to act), and of “imposition” 
(whereby an outsider’s vision of the needs and/or desires of a community is unduly 
imposed upon it).
Coady is moderate and sensible in his treatment of these concerns. The solution, 
in his view, is not to abandon rescue efforts altogether100—although in her comments 
Vasuki Nesiah suggests that Coady should be more profoundly concerned about the 
growing prominence of “rescue” as a human rights imperative. Instead, like Gilabert, 
Coady recommends that we use these critical observations constructively, to formulate 
lessons that can help improve decision-making and rescue efforts in the future.
If we accept, as Coady does, that rescue is sometimes necessary even though it may 
well lead to disaster, whether as a result of moralism or any other failure, then his 
 constructive approach is indispensable. Clearly, we ought to think about how to do 
necessary work well. The looming challenge is to figure out how best to institutionalize 
and develop the enlightened sense of prudence or caution that Coady argues for, but 
(and this is no small feat) without letting it transform, when practised, into a paralytic 
aversion to rescue that he sees no reason to embrace.
VI. Individuals, Borders, and Groups
Most agree that human rights are typically held by individual human beings, princi-
pally against the state. That is, after all, true of most of the rights one finds in key 
international human rights documents like the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR.101 And 
critics have taken note. The ostensible individualistic orientation of human rights 
brought them firmly into the crosshairs of the so-called “communitarian” critique of 
rights that flourished during the 1990s. Drawing partly on Marx,102 communitarians 
100 See e.g. Zolo 2010.
101 See: Nickel 2007, ch. 1; Nickel 2014, sec. 1, for a longer list of prominent features of such rights.
102 See: Gilabert in this volume, for a brief discussion.
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insisted that the affirmation of individual rights distracts us from the importance 
of “community,” social responsibility, socio-economic equality, and the basic inter-
dependence of human beings.103
These criticisms have been vigorously contested.104 And the communitarian critique 
is at least partly undermined by the fact that affirming rights simply is a way of affirm-
ing certain social responsibilities. Rights, or rather “claim rights,” of which human 
rights are mostly composed, logically correlate with duties—duties owed to the rights-
bearer by some agent or set thereof.105 And so issues of social responsibility and human 
interdependence are, in a very basic sense, never far from view when rights claims are 
at stake, regardless of whether these are individual claims or not.
Another fact that undermines the communitarian critique is that human rights 
instruments are designed to protect and promote community life in various ways. The 
UDHR recognizes rights to nondiscrimination (Article 1), equality before the law 
(Article 7), freedom of association (Article 17), and freedom of thought and expression 
(Article 18), all of which are crucial to the flourishing of minority groups.106 The 
ICCPR—leaning on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948)—recognizes “genocide” (the targeting of a specific group for destruc-
tion) as a grave and punishable crime under international law (Article 6). And the 
ICCPR explicitly recognizes the rights of “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities . . . to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language” (Article 27).
Perhaps most notable of all, both the ICCPR and ICESCR recognize (in Article 1, 
no less) the rights of “peoples” to political self-determination: “to freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.” 
One of the remarkable features of this right, as well as some of those listed above, is that 
it is clearly assigned to groups rather than individual persons. The right grants an 
entitlement of self-rule to a “people”—a political collective—not to any one person as 
such. This represents a strong break from the general focus on individual rights in inter-
national human rights law, and provides it with a striking communitarian component.
But the inclusion of group rights within standard lists of human rights also opens 
up difficult questions of its own. For one, (i) it raises questions about who, or rather 
what, can hold human rights. The ICCPR and ICESCR might assign human rights to 
groups, but how does this fit with other features often attributed to such rights: for 
instance, that they are held (a) universally by all persons, including by those who (for 
any number of reasons) lack membership in a political group; or that they are held 
(b) naturally, simply in virtue of one’s humanity, and therefore not as a result of contin-
gent facts about group affiliation? Upon reflection, the inclusion of group rights in 
103 See e.g. Glendon 1991, ch. 4; Etzioni 1993, pp. 1–23; Yew 1992.
104 See e.g. Alston & Goodman 2012, pp. 509–30; Donnelly 2013, chs. 7, 12; Gould 2004, ch. 5; Shue 1996b, 
pp. 218–19; Taylor 1999.
105 See: Hohfeld 1923, pp. 36–8; Feinberg 1970.
106 See: Nickel 2007, ch. 10 and Donnelly 2013, ch. 3, for good discussions on this.
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standard lists of human rights may seem like a category mistake, and in some cases 
also a moral mistake.107
Second, (ii) the recognition of group rights generates special normative tensions 
within human rights doctrine. The right of peoples to self-determination is naturally 
understood to include a right to border control—to set rules that determine the con-
ditions of entry, visitation, passage, immigration, and exit. It’s hard to imagine how a 
group could be genuinely self-determining without the ability to exercise some 
degree of control over such matters. But this right (to exclude) comes into conflict 
with other human rights that guarantee freedom of movement across borders: for 
instance, the right to leave any country,108 as well as the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
from persecution.109
In a sense, then, the demands of international human rights sit on either side of 
political borders; they are a source of duties to let outsiders in and of permissions to 
keep them out. It is not unusual for human rights to generate conflicting practical 
demands—as they famously do, for instance, in the case of the human rights to 
security110 and to privacy.111 But any such tension calls for an effort to “balance” 
competing claims, which requires careful evaluation of the considerations at hand.
These questions about how (and indeed whether) human rights serve the interests of 
political groups engage a core focus of this volume: the political dimensions of human 
rights. To date, (i) the status of group rights within the human rights corpus remains a 
controversial question,112 and (ii) the normative or practical tensions generated by the 
affirmation of such rights have been a source of energetic and unresolved debate.113 
The contributions in this sixth and final Part of the volume aim to make progress on 
both of these key issues.
* * *
Peter Jones’s chapter examines whether the right of peoples to self-determination can 
properly be thought of as a human right: question (i). Jones is interested in whether a case 
can be made for the moral existence of such a human right, but assumes that a favourable 
answer to this question would justify its legal recognition as well—an assumption that, as 
noted in Section III of this introduction, can reasonably be disputed.
Jones argues that group rights like the right to self-determination can indeed be 
understood as human rights, but only under certain conditions. One such condition, 
in his view, is that the right be “collective” in a special sense: not in virtue of being 
borne by a single corporate entity, but rather as a result of being a right that individuals 
107 Consider, for instance, the ECtHR’s 2011 decision that a corporation, the Yukos Oil Company, holds 
human rights [in Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation]. My thanks to Rowan 
Cruft for bringing this example to my attention.
108 UDHR, Article 13; ICCPR, Article 12. 109 UDHR, Article 14.
110 UDHR, Article 3; ICCPR, Article 6, 9. 111 UDHR, Article 12; ICCPR, Article 17.
112 See e.g. Buchanan 2013, p. 77; Donnelly 2013, ch. 3; Griffin 2008, ch. 15; Newman 2011; Nickel 
2007, ch. 10.
113 See e.g. Abizadeh 2008; Benhabib 2004; Carens 2013; Miller 2005; Risse 2008.
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hold jointly, and only jointly. This condition is important, Jones argues, because it 
means that the human right of peoples to political self-determination is ultimately 
born by individual human beings, which he thinks is an essential feature of human 
rights in general.
Another condition is that the right concern itself only with what Jones calls the 
“determination principle.” This principle requires that there be a one-to-one match 
between the people whose collective lives are determined in a certain territory and 
those who do the determining. In effect, it grants a right to self-determination to all 
extant political groups, regardless of their composition, history, and current geograph-
ical extension. However, the principle takes no position on what Jones calls the “issue 
of selfhood”—that is, the question of which specific units of population qualify as 
“peoples” deserving of political constitution in the first place. Jones argues that the 
determination principle can be brought within the compass of human rights thinking, 
but that the issue of selfhood cannot.
The reason for this, he explains, is that we are unlikely to discover any general rules 
that allow us to determine which groups deserve to be politically constituted as a 
“people” and which do not. The territory of the world is not fairly or justly divided. 
Many populations have been wrongly stripped of territories and political control that 
they deserve—that much is clear. Nonetheless, it is often difficult to know exactly 
where just borders should lie, or exactly which populations (and sub-populations) 
deserve to keep or newly gain political independence as a result of their special history, 
identity, or status as a “people.” If any answers are to be found here, they are likely to be 
highly contextual, historically contingent, and will often be morally hazy. This makes 
the issue of selfhood an unsuitable topic for human rights doctrine, in Jones’s view—
which he thinks of as oriented towards more universalistic and less morally ambiguous 
 concerns—though he admits that the issue can and should be approached with other 
normative tools.
As Will Kymlicka points out in his commentary, this is a severe restriction. If the 
purpose of the human right to collective self-determination is to protect peoples 
against unjust interferences with their sovereignty, then the issue of selfhood cannot 
really be avoided. After all, as Kymlicka points out, some of the most insidious violations 
of sovereignty—such as annexation and forced settlement—target the composition of 
the demos; they strip political power from a people without quite violating the 
determination principle itself, since in theory they may allow the (altered) demos to 
self-govern. Surely, Kymlicka argues, the human right to collective self-determination 
should protect peoples against such forms of international aggression, and so take the 
issue of selfhood on board.
Kymlicka’s criticism is grounded in his provocative claim that the chief purpose of 
international human rights norms is to remedy or address fundamental injustices cre-
ated by the international legal-political order itself, and that a significant portion of 
these injustices include violations of selfhood of the kind described just above. But we 
can question Jones’s position on its own grounds.
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Jones argues that violations of selfhood should not be covered by the human right to 
collective self-determination because this would force human rights practitioners to 
tackle highly contextual and morally ambiguous problems. But this seems like an odd 
reason to limit the right. Many core human rights, such as the right to an adequate 
standard of living,114 merely point the way towards what will inevitably be a highly 
contextual determination of what individual human beings need to adequately flour-
ish in specific circumstances. And international human rights documents contain 
limitation clauses precisely because the pursuit of such rights is readily understood to 
mire agents in morally ambiguous predicaments that require costly sacrifices and 
sometimes even the infringement of human rights themselves.115 If the realization of 
human rights is already a highly contextual and morally hazardous affair, then there is 
little reason to think that the human right to collective self-determination should be 
spared from this.
Alex Levitov and Stephen Macedo’s chapter delves into some of the concrete norma-
tive ambiguities we are likely to encounter as a result of recognizing the human right to 
collective self-determination. Levitov and Macedo are specifically interested in the 
apparent conflict between this right, which seems to grant peoples a permission to 
exclude outsiders, and other human rights (or normative considerations) that guaran-
tee universal freedom of movement across borders: question (ii).
Levitov and Macedo believe that this normative conflict is real. But they develop a 
framework (which they call “cosmopolitan statism”) within which it is meant to be 
managed, if not entirely resolved. The distinguishing feature of their position is that it 
invests the state, and our obligations to compatriots, with paramount normative sig-
nificance (hence its “statism”), while also acknowledging ambitious duties towards 
outsiders (hence its “cosmopolitanism”). This latter set of duties include (a) natural 
duties of rescue, (b) natural duties to assist outsiders in domestic institution-building, 
and (c) duties of reciprocity, which include duties to engage outsiders fairly, to address 
past wrongs, and to improve international institutions so that reciprocally fair inter-
state relations are easier to establish.
Because Levitov and Macedo acknowledge such strong obligations both to com-
patriots and to outsiders, the conflict that they aim to arbitrate turns out to be a “hard 
case.” So much so that they are keen to stress the “reasonableness” of multiple 
approaches to it—that is, multiple immigration schemes that balance these duties in 
different ways, from more closed to more open.
Given this reasonable plurality, they argue, states deserve a wide degree of discre-
tion, or freedom from external interference, in deciding just what type of immigration 
scheme to adopt. Indeed, following language familiar from Rawls,116 Levitov and 
Macedo suggest that states should even be free to adopt unreasonably or unfairly 
restrictive immigration policies, providing these don’t fall into the domain of the “fully 
114 UDHR, Article 25; ICESCR, Article 11.
115 UDHR, Article 29; ICESCR, Article 4; ICCPR, Article 18. 116 Rawls 1999, pp. 74–5.
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unreasonable.” Fully unreasonable immigration policies, Levitov and Macedo explain, 
violate the human rights of outsiders, which is intolerable.
Thus, for instance, a state may refuse to grant entry to low-skilled migrant workers 
whose basic needs are already met at home, but it cannot refuse entry to individuals 
fleeing persecution, which would amount to a clear violation of their human rights. 
And to make sure that states stay well within the boundaries of the reasonable when it 
comes to immigration, Levitov and Macedo suggest that immigration policies should 
be regularly vetted by multilateral international organizations specifically charged 
with this task, and capable of imposing reputational and material penalties when states 
fall short.
In her wide-ranging commentary, Seyla Benhabib points out that immigration policies 
determine more than just how many outsiders will be allowed into a state, and under 
what conditions; they also determine how outsiders are treated once they gain entry, 
whether legally or illegally. Benhabib turns our attention from non-citizens outside 
our borders to those who are already here among us, and she persuasively argues that 
states should have no discretion when it comes to respecting the human rights of 
domestic non-citizens, including their socio-economic human rights: “by penalizing 
unsanitary and exploitative work conditions, and by expediting the integration of 
undocumented migrants into the social network of the country in question through 
state or city-issued identity cards, the issuance of social security numbers, etc.”
Interestingly, Benhabib also points out that states that fully respect the human rights 
of domestic non-citizens may paradoxically see a reduction in immigration, since this 
is likely to reduce the availability of cheap, exploitative labour. These observations pro-
vide an important complement to Levitov and Macedo’s analysis of border policy.
There is an ambiguity that courses through Levitov and Macedo’s discussion of the 
human right to collective self-determination. On one understanding of the right, 
it grants peoples a permission to exclude non-citizens (whether at home or abroad) 
from entry or full membership. But Levitov and Macedo adopt a more ambitious 
interpretation of the right, as one that grants peoples a permission to unfairly exclude 
outsiders from entry or full-membership—essentially, a permission to do wrong.
This is not an implausible interpretation of the right. But it is far from inevitable. 
And moreover, Levitov and Macedo’s focus on the extent of peoples’ freedom to be 
unfair or unreasonable distracts their analysis from the question of just what a fair and 
reasonable immigration policy should look like in the first place. Readers looking for 
an answer to the latter question rather than the former will want to hear more.
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